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Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) developed a straightforward method
to detect wage discrimination using matched employer-employee data. In
this paper a new method to measure wage discrimination is proposed, that
builds on the ideas rst developed by Hellerstein and Neumark. It has
four main advantages: it is robust to labor market segregation, it does not
impose linearity on the wage setting equation, it avoids the problematic
estimation of production functions, and it is not only a test for discrim-
ination but also produces measures of discrimination. Using matched
employer-employee data from Germany, I nd that immigrants are being
discriminated against. They receive wages which are 13 percent lower
than native workers in the same rm.
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11 Introduction
In the Altonji and Blank's handbook chapter (1999), labor market discrimina-
tion is dened as a situation in which persons who provide labor market services
and who are equally productive in a physical or material sense are treated un-
equally in a way that is related to an observable characteristic such as race,
ethnicity or gender.
The most widely-used approach to test for labor market discrimination takes
the unexplained gap in Mincer-type wage regressions as evidence of discrimi-
nation. This method, also known as the residual method, estimates Mincer-
equations for both groups and then decomposes the dierence in mean wages
into \explained" and \unexplained" components. The fraction of the gap that
cannot be explained by dierences in observable characteristics is considered to
be discrimination. In spirit of Altonji and Blank's denition, the residual ap-
proach may be understood as a comparison of wages and productivity where the
latter is approximated by a function of observable characteristics. However, if
there are unobservable characteristics that correlate with migration status and
that are also correlated with productivity1, this discrimination measure may be
biased.
The availability of matched employer-employee data allows a response to
this potential weakness of the residual approach. In the absence of good enough
worker level data to control for dierences in productivity, a smart idea is to
directly estimate the productivity gap using output measures at the rm level.
Whenever perfect competition holds in the labor market any dierence in wages
that is not driven by a dierence in productivity may be considered discrimi-
nation. Hellerstein and Neumark (1999); and Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske
(1999); proposed a method that builds on that intuition. It uses rm-level data
to estimate the relative marginal products of various types of workers, which
are then compared with their relative wages. The productivity of each type of
worker is estimated in terms of the proportion of workers of each type in the
1We typically think of environmental variables, tastes, education quality and language
skills.
2rm. Given that its implementation and the interpretation of its results are
extremely simple, this approach has been signicantly popular in the last ten
years. An important number of papers have applied this method to dierent
countries, including the already mentioned Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) pa-
per with Israeli data, and the Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (1999) article
using U.S. data, in addition to Verner (1999) using data from Ghana, Crepon,
Deniau and P erez-Duarte (2002) with French data, Lopez-Acevedo et al (2005)
with data from Mexico, Zhang and Dong (2009) and Rickne (2010) with Chinese
data, Van Biesebroeck, (2009) with data from three Sub-Saharan countries and
Campos-Vazquez (2009) with German data.
This paper proposes a method to test for labor market discrimination that
builds on the Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) idea of directly using productiv-
ity data to measure discrimination. I take advantage of a matched employer-
employee panel data set to estimate a reduced form wage setting equation at
the rm level that tests; controlling for productivity and rm's xed charac-
teristics; whether the proportion of immigrants is signicant. This approach
exploits the within-rm variation of the native-immigrant composition across
time to identify dierent wage policies toward those groups.
This approach adds to the existing test of wage discrimination in three main
dimensions: rstly it provides quantitative measures of wage discrimination.
Comparing relative wages and relative productivity is only informative on the
existence of wage discrimination. Secondly, it does not impose linearity on the
wage setting equation. Comparing relative wages and relative productivity is in-
formative with regard to discrimination whenever the function that links wages
and productivity is linear. The strategy proposed in this paper is more exible
allowing the wage-productivity elasticity to be dierent from one. Finally, and
more importantly, it produces measures of discrimination that are robust to
labor market segregation. As Altonji and Blank (1999) note, the variation in
worker composition is likely to be correlated with heterogeneity in the produc-
tion technology and may be endogenous to the model. If this is the case, the
Hellerstein and Neumark test for discrimination estimated with cross sectional
3data would not be valid.
There have been two main attempts to control for the worker's composi-
tion endogeneity. In a more recent paper, Hellerstein and Neumark (2004)
propose to take segregation into account by dealing with omitted plant-specic
productivity parameters as in Olley and Pakes (1996). Although this method
proposes a potential solution to the estimation of some parameters of the pro-
duction function, its implications in this context are not totally clear. Firstly,
as Mairesse and Griliches (1998) point out, the Olley and Pakes method may
not be the best alternative if in the rm-specic productivity term there are
mostly xed components2. Secondly, the model presented by Olley and Pakes
implies a correlation of the rm labor input with the plant-specic productivity
parameter, but does not generate endogeneity in worker composition3. Finally,
it is not clear how the wage gap should be estimated once we have estimated
the productivity gap using this strategy.
The alternative strategy is to control for endogenous composition by follow-
ing a more typical xed-eects panel data approach. Exploiting within rm
variation, both the wage gap and the productivity gap are well dened but it is
problematic to achieve precise estimates of the relative productivity parameter.
The lack of precision in the quality parameter estimates is a pervasive problem
in Cobb-Douglas production functions with quality adjusted labor input when
we only exploit within rm variation4. The approach presented in this paper
also exploit within rm variation, but it avoids the estimation of production
functions, and therefore it may produce precise measures of wage discrimina-
tion.
As a spin-o of the main results, the method also allows me to estimate rm-
2This is because the rm's capital has already adjusted to the rm specic productivity
term, and hence the investment at time t would not depend on the former
3This is because Hellerstein and Neumark include worker heterogeneity in a Cobb-Douglas
production function with quality linearly-adjusted labor input. This production function
imposes perfect substitution between workers' groups: therefore in the context of Olley and
Pakes, the rent-maximizing rm only takes into account the total labor input in eciency
units, and the composition of this input should be exogenous
4See for example Hellerstein and Neumark (1998); Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006)
or Bartolucci (2010).
4specic discrimination parameters following the strategy presented by Arellano
and Bonhomme (2009). Although these estimates are noisy (I have a small-
T panel), the unbiased correlation with other rm variables, such as prot or
tenure of immigrants, may be estimated and used to obtain indirect evidence of
dierent discrimination theories, testing some of their implications.
I use a 1996-2005 panel of matched employer-employee data provided by
the German Labor Agency, called LIAB.5 This dataset is especially useful for
the current study for two reasons. Firstly, it contains essential data about
the workers' nationalities. Secondly, it is a panel that tracks rms as opposed
to individuals, which is necessary for obtaining estimates in the wage setting
equation that are robust to a correlated rm xed eect.
The results show that immigrants suer from wage discrimination. Depend-
ing on the measure of productivity and the specication used, the immigrant
wage premium ranges between -7 and -17 percent, and is always signicantly
negative. These ndings are dierent from the conclusions drawn by the tra-
ditional and the Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) approaches. The elasticity of
wages to productivity is signicantly dierent from one: therefore assuming that
wages are a linear function of productivity may not be the best option. As op-
posed to the xed-eects estimates, when estimating by OLS the discrimination
measure was signicantly reduced, which gives evidence of positive segregation
of immigrants into good rms. Although the reduced-form wage setting equa-
tion is very simple, it has an acceptable t of the wage-bill data and the main
results of the paper are remarkably robust to many specication tests. I nd nei-
ther signicant evidence of immigrants moving to less discriminatory rms, nor
signicant evidence in favor of a statistical discrimination model: nevertheless,
I do nd evidence against a taste-based discrimination model.
A signicant portion of the empirical literature on discrimination focuses on
gender and racial discrimination. Wage dierentials between natives and immi-
grants have generally been understood as an assimilation process that involves
5This dataset is subject to strict condentiality restrictions. It is not directly available;
only after the IAB has approved the research project, The Research Data Center (FDZ) can
provide on site use or remote access to external researchers.
5dierences in productivity, such as language skills (e.g. Borjas 1994; Chiswick
and Miller 1995; Carnevale et al. 2001; Dustmann and van Soest 2002), dif-
ferences in education quality (Sweetman 2003) or dierential returns to foreign
schooling and labor market experience (e.g. Friedberg 2000 and Bratsberg and
Ragan 2002). As discrimination has normally been detected through the un-
explained gap in wage equations and this approach is not the best option to
disentangle dierences in productivity and discrimination, there are few papers
addressing labor market discrimination against immigrants. Some exceptions,
also with matched employer-employee data, are Aydemir and Skuterud (2008)
and Aeberhardt and Pouget (2007) where the sources of immigrants wage dier-
entials within and across establishments are explored. There is a new working
paper by Campos-Vazquez (2008) that uses the same LIAB data as this paper
and replicates the Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) analysis to test for discrim-
ination against German immigrants.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I briey
describe the immigration phenomena in Germany. In Section 3, I present the
model and I formally compare it with the Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) ap-
proach. In the fourth section, I present the data-set. Section 5 presents the
results and robustness check. In Section 6, I show how this method can be used
to distinguish between dierent discrimination theories and in the last section,
I conclude.
2 Background
Germany is a very interesting country through which to study migration, mainly
because immigrants represent an important and stable fraction of the popula-
tion. The proportion of immigrants has experienced very limited change in the
last 15 years ranging between 8.2 percent and 8.9 percent, see Figure 1.
The rst immigration wave that immediately followed the end of the Second
World War started when several millions of refugees from the former East Ger-
many and from Eastern European regions resettled in the Federal Republic of
6Germany.
The second immigration wave started in 1955, when Italy and Germany
signed a treaty which allowed organized recruitment of Italian workers to meet
the needs of the growing German economy. The recruitment of the foreign labor
force intensied dramatically reacting to the sharp increase in demand for addi-
tional labor force. This policy was expanded to the following countries: Spain
and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia
(1965) and Yugoslavia (1968)6. These agreements were intended to meet the
needs of the German economy by reducing the movement costs of unskilled
workers. Foreign workers were recruited to Germany on a temporary basis.
The practice of foreign labor recruitment stopped in 1973, following the oil
crisis and a sharp decrease in labor demand. The end of the labor recruit-
ment and new barriers for foreign workers to settling in Germany minimized
the short-term immigration and started a new tendency toward permanent set-
tlement among those who entered Germany as temporary workers. This was the
start of the next period of immigration to Germany, the one based on family
reunications of guest workers who arrived earlier. The Turkish population was
the main nationality which took advantage of this possibility and in spite of
the halt placed on recruitment in 1973, it continued to rise and now forms the
largest foreign minority in Germany.
Since the late 1980s, the inow of refugees and asylum seekers has increased
and has marked another phase in post-war immigration. The number of asylum
applicants rose signicantly in the second half of the 1980s and peaked at 440,000
in 1992, partly as a result of the war in the former Yugoslavia. Between 1988
and 1992, 1.1 million asylum-seekers led applications. As a reaction to this, the
German Parliament agreed to the \asylum compromise" in 1993, which made
applying for political asylum in Germany considerably more dicult. Hence,
the number of applications for asylum has declined steadily and the proportion
of immigrants has stabilized, see Figure (1).
The percentage of immigrants in Germany increased from less than 1 per-
6See Rudolph (1994) for a good description of this phenomenon.
7Figure 1: Number and Proportion of Immigrants
cent, 506,000 foreigners in 1955 to 8.2 percent in 20077, 6,744,879 registered
immigrants8, see Figure (1). In terms of workers, in my sample the fraction of
immigrants is slightly higher and ranges from 9.4 to 10.9 percent between 1996
and 2004. See Section 4 for more details.
3 The Model
As stated in the introduction, Altonji and Blank (1999) dene labor market
discrimination as a situation in which persons who provide labor market services
and who are equally productive in a physical or material sense are treated
unequally in a way that is related to an observable characteristic such as race,
ethnicity or gender.
Following the handbook's denition of labor market discrimination, individ-
ual productivity should be a sucient statistic to explain wages. Therefore,
7Data from the Federal Oce for Migration and Refugees.
8There are no statistics concerning irregular immigration or immigrants staying in Ger-
many without a permit. Unocial estimates, which refer to between 500,000 and one million
irregular immigrants residing in Germany, are not based on scientic assessment. As the data
used in this paper come from social security records I consider only registered immigrants.
8discrimination could be detected estimating the following generic wage setting
equation:
Wi;j;t = F(Pi;j;t;Ii); (1)
where Wi;j;t is the wage of individual i, on rm j, at time t, Pi;j;t is the
individual productivity and I is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if
the individual is foreign born. We would be able to test if rms discriminate
against immigrants if we could test if F(Pijt;Ii = 1) 6= F(Pijt;Ii = 0)
Without making structural assumptions on the labor market model gener-
ating the data, the functional form of F(:;:) is unknown. As a baseline, let me
consider a log-linear approximation to F(:;:):
wijt =  + pijt + Ii + ijt; (2)
where wijt is the log-wage of individual i, on rm j, at time t, pijt is the
individual log-productivity and Ii is an immigrant indicator. In this context,
I interpret ijt as an econometric mean-zero residual term due to the imposed
log-linearity in the wage setting equation.
Firms may dier in terms of observed characteristics like region, sector or
unionization of the workforce but they could also dier in terms unobserved ones
as wages policies, risk aversion, technology or managerial quality. It is likely
that some of these dierences may imply dierences in the rm's wage setting
equation. To capture rm xed heterogeneity let j be rm specic. In Section
6, I propose a wage setting equation where more heterogeneity is allowed9.
As discrimination was dened as a situation in which workers who provide
labor market services and who are equally productive in a physical or material
sense are treated unequally in a way that is related with their migration status,
in this context, a direct test for discrimination would be to test  6= 010.
9In Section 6: I allow for heterogeneity in . This would imply a dierence if  Ijt is
correlated with j and then E(j) 6= .
10In Section 5.2.3, I also allow for dierent s according to the migration status.
9Although the log-linearity assumption is relaxed in Subsections 5.2.2, 5.2.3
and 5.2.4, it is a convenient specication for the following reasons:
Figure 2: Log(Productivity) and log(Wages)
 It is the natural specication to connect wages and productivity, which,
using rm level data, have been found to be approximately log-normally
distributed, see gure 211.
 It provides a direct connection with the residual approach, where the log-
wage equation is a linear combination of workers and rm characteristics,
proxying the match productivity.
 The interpretation of the parameters is straightforward, in terms of con-
stant elasticities.
 The log-linear wage equation, at the rm level, has a reasonably good
11Figure 3 has being constructed using 24,444 observations. The top 1% and the botton
1% of the distribution of output per worker has been excluded.
10performance tting the data. See Figure 3,12 and measures of the goodness
of t of the model in the estimations presented in Section 5.
Figure 3: Log-Linear Wage Setting Equation
To directly estimate (2) is not feasible because individual productivity is
generally unobserved. There are some cases where individual productivity is
more easily measured such as academic positions, see Ferber and Green (1982),
or jobs with under-piece contracts, see Milgrom, Petersen and Snartland (2007).
Although this kind of study may have measures of individual productivity, they
are likely to be weaker in terms of external validity.
3.1 The Hellerstein and Neumark approach
The Hellerstein and Neumark approach has been found to be a very convincing
method to detect wage discrimination. Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) and
Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (1999) use matched employer-employee data
from Israel and the US to estimate relative marginal products of various types
12Due to condentiality restriction the IAB is not allowed to provide any data which refer to
individual observations. Each point in a scatter plot is considered as individual information:
therefore scatter plots can only be shown if the point cloud is compact enough to avoid
any possible identication of individual information. Figure 3 has been constructed using
20,559 observations (82.4% of the observations of the original sample). I exclude extreme
observation (below the fth percentile, and above the 95th percentile, 2,494 observations) of
the distribution of the residual term in a linear regression of the logarithm of mean-wage at
each rm, on the logarithm of total output per worker at each rm, I also exclude the extreme
observations (below the fth percentile, and above the 95th percentile, 1,890 observations) of
the original distribution of output per worker.
11of workers. Then they compare productivity dierentials ( =
E(PijtjIi=1)
E(PijtjIi=0)) with
wage dierentials ( =
E(WijtjIi=1)
E(WijtjIi=0)).
Most of their popularity arose because their idea is very natural. If ob-
servable worker characteristics are not a convincing enough proxy of worker
productivity, we cannot trust on the residual approach. Therefore, it may be
convenient to directly estimate productivity. Assuming that wages are a linear
function of productivity, the test is straightforward.
 is estimated exploiting data on rms' wage bills and dierences in gender
composition across rms. They estimate by nonlinear least squares the following
equation:




where  wjt is the mean wage paid by rm j; L is the total number of workers in
the plant j; and Lw is the proportion of women.
 is estimated with production functions, assuming a Cobb-Douglas or trans-
logarithmic functional forms with quality adjusted labor input. In their simpler
case, they estimate marginal products of women and men by NLLS in the fol-
lowing equation:





where Kjt is capital, Mjt is material, g(Kjt;Mjt;L
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jt) is the second order term
in the production function and L
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where L is the total number of workers in the plant and LW is the number of
women in the plant13.
The Hellerstein and Neumark strategy may be interpreted within the frame-
work presented in this paper. Whether to estimate (2) is not feasible because
individual productivity is not observed, it is possible to aggregate (2) at the
13The Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) model is more complicated because they allow for
several population groups. See Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) for details.
12group level, and then to recover . Taking averages of equation (2) across
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: (4)
Subtracting (4) from (3) and noting that (ijtjIi = 1) = 0 and (ijtjIi =
0) = 0 14, we have:
    (5)
















where  represents the ratio between the mean wage of immigrant workers
and the mean wage of native workers, and  represents the immigrant-native
relative productivity.     is informative on wage discrimination if  = 1
and cov(j;Ii) = 0. Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) make inference about
discrimination (i.e.: ) simply by comparing  and  estimated at the rm level.
Although they are very cautious in their interpretation of this dierence, arguing
that ^    ^  gives evidence in favor of discrimination, if  6= 1 or cov(j;Ij) 6= 0,
there is not an a priori direction of the bias and hence it is not clear how
informative are their ndings.
14This is easily proved noting that:
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13In order to be clearer in this explanation let me decompose the bias in two
components:
Linearity Bias: The rst part of the bias addresses the fact that, whenever
a change in productivity is not fully transferred to wages, two groups with
dierent productivity may have larger or smaller relative dierences in wages
that do not imply discrimination. As can be seen in Section 5,  is found to be
signicantly dierent from one. Depending on the specication and the measure
of productivity used, it ranges between 0.25 and 0.45. To show numerically how
important may be this bias, let me consider a very simple example where there
are two groups, A and B, where A is 20 percent more productive than B. If there
is not discrimination against any group and assuming that  = 0:4, the wage
paid to workers of the A group are supposed to only be 8 percent higher than
workers of the B group. The Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) approach would
wrongly imply that workers of the A group are being discriminated because the
productivity gap is larger than the wage gap.
Segregation Bias: The second part of the bias is relevant if there is labor
market segregation. Segregation bias, the last term in (5), is connected to the
Altonji and Blank (1999) remark on the early work of Hellerstein and Neumark
(1999). They argue that the variation in worker composition is likely to be cor-
related with heterogeneity in the production technology and may be endogenous
to the model. In this context the rm's technology is captured by the rm's
xed eect, j. There have been many attempts to deal with segregation:
 Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) rstly tried to control for some of the
observed dierences between rms by clustering the analysis at dierent
levels. If the rm heterogeneity, or at least its endogenous component,
were totally captured by a discrete variable or a combination of discrete
variables, this alternative would provide a test for discrimination that is
robust to segregation. However, the rm's idiosyncratic component must
not necessarily be observable and discrete. Moreover, in Section 5.1, I
nd evidence of positive correlation between the proportion of immigrant
14workers in the rm and the unobserved component of the rm xed eect.
 A second attempt to deal with segregation was proposed in Hellerstein
and Neumark (2004), where the production function is estimated follow-
ing the Olley and Pakes (1996) strategy. This alternative is promising,
but some of its implications for this context are still not totally clear.
Firstly, when discussing segregation, we think of an association between
the workforce composition and the rm's type or its idiosyncratic compo-
nent, and the Olley and Pakes method may not be the best alternative if in
the rm-specic productivity term there are mostly xed components 15.
Secondly, in the model presented by Olley and Pakes, the rent-maximizing
rm chooses the level of inputs according to the plant-specic productivity
parameter. This generates endogeneity of productive inputs. But impos-
ing a production function with heterogeneous labor input where dierent
types of workers are perfect substitutes, does not generate endogeneity
of worker composition. Finally, it is also not clear how the wage gap
should be estimated once we have estimated the productivity gap using
this strategy.
 The third alternative strategy is to control for endogenous composition
including rm xed-eects. By exploiting within rm variation, both the
wage gap and the productivity gap are well dened but it is problematic
to achieve precise estimates of the relative productivity parameter. The
lack of precision in the quality parameter estimates is a pervasive problem
in the Cobb-Douglas functional form with quality adjusted labor input,
when we only exploit within rm variation. See, for example, Hellerstein
and Neumark (1999) where, using this strategy, they obtain estimates of
the productivity gap that are almost non-informative16.
15This was point out in Mairesse and Griliches (1998) and is because the rm's capital has
already adjusted to the rm specic productivity term, and hence the investment at time t
would not depend on the former
16Among dierent samples and specications, when they only exploit within rm variation,
the estimated gender ratios of productivity (ie : ) range between 0.61 and 0.88 and their
standard errors range between 0.33 and 0.25, therefore  is never signicantly dierent from
one, and the null hypotheses of no dierences in productivity is never rejected
153.2 Detecting discrimination at the rm-level
Without measures of individual productivity, and having shown that to aggre-
gate at the group level might also be problematic in some cases, a second best
would be to aggregate the equation (2) within the rm:
 wjt = j +  pjt +  Ijt + jt; (6)
where  wjt is the mean of log-wages in rm j,  pjt is the mean of individual
log-productivity of rm j, and  Ijt is the proportion of immigrants in rm j at
time t17.
The advantage of aggregating equation (2) within the rm is that it is now
feasible to estimate equation (6) due to the availability of productivity measures
at the rm level. The conceptually relevant measure of productivity should be
the marginal productivity of workers in rm j. Assuming the standard Cobb-






where Aj is the rm xed eect, Yjt is the output of rm j at time t, Kjt
is its capital, and L
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17The migration status indicator, Ii, is worker specic, but the proportion of immigrant




Therefore, using the log of output per worker or using the log of mean
marginal productivity would only modify the constant term j in (6) adding
 log(l) to it.
This specication has the advantage that it does not necessarily imply esti-
mating relative productivity as in Hellerstein and Neumark (1999). The use of
group specic productivity measures usually involves the estimation of a pro-
duction function with quality adjusted labor input. In order to have estimates
robust to any correlation of inputs, including labor input composition, with the
rm xed eect, the production function should be estimated by dierenced-
GMM as in Arellano and Bond (1989), or by SYSTEM-GMM using the set of
instruments proposed in Arellano and Bover (1995). When estimating this kind
of production function by GMM, I signicantly lose precision and the quality-
adjustment parameters are almost non-informative. This problem is usual in
this production function specication. In the Appendix, I present the Non Lin-
ear Least Squares estimates of the production function in levels to compare my
results with those obtained with the Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) approach.
4 Data
The data I use for the present study refer to West-German workers18 contained
in the linked employer-employee dataset of the IAB (LIAB) which covers the
period 1996-2005. LIAB is created by matching the data from the IAB estab-
lishment panel and the process-produced data from the Federal Employment
Services (Social security records).
The IAB Establishment Panel is an annual survey of German establishments,
which started in Western Germany in 1993 and was extended to Eastern Ger-
many in 1996. The sample of selected establishments is random and stratied
18All employees and trainees subject to social security are included, while the self-employed,
family workers, a subgroup of civil servants (\Beamte"), students enrolled in higher education
and those in marginal employment are excluded
17by industries, establishment size and regions. The sample unit is the establish-
ment. The establishments approached to complete in the survey are selected
from the parent sample of all German establishments that employ at least one
employee covered by social security. Participation of establishments is volun-
tary, but the response rates are high, they exceed 70 percent19. The rm's data
gives details of total sales, value added, investment, total wage bill, deprecia-
tion, number of workers and sector. I only consider rms with strictly positive
output. To ensure a consistent comparison of results across specications, the
data used for each specication exclude observations with missing values for any
of the independent variables used in the regressions. Firms in the nancial and












Imm. Prop within-firm Std. Dev. 2.6%
Observations 20,886
Note: * per annum in millions of euros. Descriptive statistics obtained from the panel
of rms.
The distinctive feature of this data is the combination of information about
individuals and details concerning the rms in which these people work. The
workers' source contains valuable data on age, sex, migration status20, daily
wage (censored at the upper earnings limit for social security contributions),
19For a more precise description of this dataset, see Alda et al (2005)
20I consider immigrants to these workers who do not have the German nationality. In 1.999
there was a law reform that modied the naturalization criteria. In Section B, I discuss this
issue in more depth and show that the main results of the paper are valid independently of
the change in this law
18schooling/training, occupation based on a 3-digit code and the establishment
number.
Table 2: Demographic Dierences
Immigrants Natives
Sex (%) 25.6 31,2
Age (years) 39.6 40.4
Tenure (years) 10.5 11.1
Experience (years) 15.1 16.7
Unskilled (%) 80.9 52.4
Part-time jobs (%) 9.2 12.8
Agriculture (%) 2.5 3.9
Manufacturing (%) 70.3 59.1
Construction (%) 3.0 3.3
Trade (%) 3.5 6.9
Services (%) 20.6 26.7
Daily Wages (e) 94.7 109.0
Observations 1.185.362 11.832.370
Note: Descriptive statistics estimated from the panel of workers. As wages are censored
at the upper earnings limit for social security contributions, mean-wages are obtained
by Maximum-Likelihood assuming log-normality.
In Table 2, I present descriptive statistics of both immigrants and natives,
estimated from the sample of workers. The proportion of women is signicantly
higher in the native population. Immigrants are younger and they have less
tenure and experience. There are important dierences in terms of occupations
and sectors. Immigrants are more concentrated in the manufacturing sector and
low-skill occupations21 than natives.
5 Results
In this section, I present results of the estimation of the baseline specication
(6) and I examine the robustness of these benchmark estimates.
21Following the FDZ's criteria, I have considered the following groups to be unskilled jobs:
Agrarian occupations, manual occupations, services and simple commercial or administrative
occupations. However, I have considered the following groups to be skilled jobs: engineers,
professional or semi-professional occupations, qualied commercial or administrative occupa-
tions, and managerial occupations.
19To estimate equation (6), I replace  wjt with the log of the mean-wage in
rm j at time t and  pjt with the log of the output per-worker22 in rm j at
time t. Although the conceptually most convenient measure of productivity is
value added, in this data set this measure may have some reliability problems23.
Assuming that a constant fraction of the output is spent in materials, both
measures would be equivalent for my purposes but, as a proof of robustness, I
report results with both measures.
Table 3: Wage Setting Equation
wjt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
output - - 0.426 0.486 - -
- - (0.013) (0.006) - -
V alue Added - - - - 0,392 0.233
- - - - (0.013) (0.005)
 -0.181 -0.258 0.070 -0.126 0.032 -0.168
(0.044) (0.043) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.049)
Fixed Effects no yes no yes no yes
obs. 29,943 29,943 29,943 29,943 29,943 29,943
R2 1.2% - 37% - 33% -
R2-With. - 1.4% - 28% - 13%
R2-Betw. - 0.2% - 38% - 35%
Note: Each column represents a single linear regression using the panel of rms. Time
dummies are included in every specication. Standard errors in parentheses. In OLS
regressions (column 1, 3 and 5) standard errors are calculated clustering by rm.
In Table 3, I present the results. In columns (1) and (2), I report the esti-
mates without including any measure of productivity. The OLS estimate of 
in column (1) is understood to be the unconditional wage gap, only controlling
for time eects. This wage gap is obtained from rm-level data and it is not
statistically dierent from the unconditional wage gap obtained from worker-
level data24. On the other hand,  estimated by within groups, without further
22As in LIAB there are data on total output and total wage bill paid by each rm, to
estimate equation (6), I replace the mean of the log with the log of the mean of wages and
productivity. This is discussed in greater depth in the Appendix A.
23See Adisson, Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2003) for a thorough discussion on this issue.
24The unconditional wage gap obtained from worker-level data is -13.1 percent, see Table
13
20controls, refers to the average unconditional wage gap within rms. The dif-
ference between the overall wage dierential and the within rm wage gap is
informative about sorting of immigrants into rms, this issue will be discussed
further in the next subsection.
In columns (2) and (3), I report estimates using output per worker as a
measure of productivity. In this specication the estimated premium for being
an immigrant is 7 percent, marginally signicant (p-value = 0.082). However,
estimating the same specication by within groups it is noteworthy that the dis-
crimination parameter is -12.6 percent, also signicant but now negative, which
would imply that immigrants are being discriminated. This nding is surprising
if we take into account that, using the same data, both the traditional approach
and the Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) approach conclude that immigrants
are not receiving signicantly lower wages than natives25.
Estimating equation (6) but including value added per worker as a measure
of productivity, ^  is lower in both estimations, OLS and WG. I nd the same
pattern in terms of 0s than in columns (3) and (4). The lower punctual esti-
mate of V alue Added; and the lower R2 may be understood to be evidence of
measurement error in value added as pointed out by Addison et al (2003).
It is important to note that , the elasticity of wages to productivity, is
found to be signicantly dierent from one in every specication and, hence,
the assumption that wages are equal or a constant fraction of productivity, may
be critical. These results suggest that the linearity bias described in Section 3.1
would be relevant in this dataset.
Note that without including any measure of productivity there is obviously
a very poor t of the wage data. However, when including productivity in
these regressions, the R2 becomes acceptable and similar to the standard R2's
obtained with individual level wage regressions.
25See Sections D and E in the Appendix
215.1 Segregation
The positive dierence ^ OLS   ^ WG may be understood to be evidence in fa-
vor of positive segregation of immigrants into rms with higher xed eect.
This positive segregation implies an underestimation of discrimination when
the within-rm variation is not isolated.
In the Appendix D, I present discrimination measures estimated with Mincer-
Equations and an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. I nd that the unexplained
wage gap is 2 percent which would mean that immigrants have a positive pre-
mium, this is also found in the analysis with OLS. My hypothesis is that this
positive premium is mainly due to positive segregation.
The concept of segregation aims to capture systematic sorting by workers
belonging to dierent groups. Segregation becomes interesting when this sorting
is associated with job characteristics that nally aect wages. Whenever the
concentration of workers is higher in some regions or in some sectors, it may re-
veal self selection of immigrants and its policy implication will be small. On the
other hand, a measurement to establish whether immigrants are systematically
sorted into worst paying rms, within a region, sector and rm size cell, may
provide evidence of more policy relevant structural dierences between both
groups.
Comparing the wage premium of immigrants, estimated with dierent sets
of controls, I provide indirect evidence of the relative importance of various
dimensions of immigrant segregation in generating dierences in wages. Results
are reported in Table 4.
In order to make the comparison with previous results easier, the rst and
last columns replicate the results reported in Table 3. In column (2), I report
results when only controls for region are included. When I control for region,
I observe that the estimated  is smaller than the one reported in column
(1). This nding connects with Borjas (1999), who argues that immigrants are
not randomly assigned to regions, presumably they choose areas which provide
them with better opportunities. The presence of a lower  when controlling
22Table 4: Segregation
wjt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
output 0.426 0.419 0.446 0.427 0.486
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.006)
 0.070 0.026 0.039 -0.066 -0.126
(0.040) (0.042) (0.038) (0.040) (0.042)
Region no yes no yes -
Sector no no yes yes -
Firm Characteristics no no no yes -
Firm Fixed Eects no no no no yes
obs 24.943 24,943 20,886 23,720 19,663
R2 0.372 0.372 0.433 0.445 0.369
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
V alue Added 0.392 0.385 0.372 0.355 0.233
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.005)
 0.033 0.014 0.010 -0.081 -0.168
(0.040) (0.041) (0.038) (0.040) (0.046)
Sector no yes no yes -
Region no no yes yes -
Firm Characteristics no no no yes -
Firm Fixed Eects no no no no yes
obs 24,943 24,943 20,886 24,943 19,663
R2 0.335 0.334 0.369 0.387 0.347
Note: Each column represents a single within-group linear regression using the panel of
rms. Time dummies are included in every specication. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses. In OLS regressions (column 1,2,3 and 4) standard errors are calculated clustering
by rm. R
2 do not take into account the variation in rm xed eects.
by region is consistent with this assessment, because it indicates that part of
the positive premium that immigrants obtain is due to their choice of region.
Positive segregation in term of region has also been found in Canada by Aydemir
and Skuterud (2008).
Column (3) reports results when controls for Industry have only been in-
cluded. These controls may be important if we take into account the fact that
the sectoral composition is signicantly dierent across migration status, see
Table 2. A comparison of  from columns (1) and (3) is informative about the
eect of industrial segregation over wages. The dierence in  is -3.1 percent
when using output and -2.3 percent when using value-added.This dierence in
23, which is signicantly dierent from zero, implies positive segregation of immi-
grants into better industries. There are several studies which aim to measure the
proportion of the gender and racial wage gap due to interindustry dierences in
worker composition. For immigrants this literature is smaller: a good example is
again Aydemir and Skuterud (2008) with Canadian matched employer-employee
data. They nd that immigrants are employed in industries with slightly lower
wage eects.
In column (4), I present results when region-eects, sector-eects and other
rm characteristics are included. I have considered rm size, an indicator of
unionization26 and an indicator that takes the value one if the rm is a single-
establishment.  is found to be signicantly lower than that reported in column
(1). This nding suggests that part of the positive wage premium that immi-
grants were supposed to receive according to the estimates presented in column
(1) is a consequence of their choices of sector, region and rm's observable
characteristics: once we control for them, immigrants receive wages between 7
percent and 8 percent lower than natives.
It is surprising that there is a great part of the wage dierential that is
not accounted for by "observable" segregation. Comparing  from columns (4)
and (5), it is noteworthy that once I control for observable and unobservable
rm xed characteristics the wage premium for immigrants is still signicantly
lower than that reported in column (4). These ndings show that immigrants
are hired in better rms than natives also within each region, sector and rm's
characteristics cell. However, within the rm they receive wages which are
between 13 percent and 17 percent lower than natives. This result suggests
that clustering the analysis in terms of observable characteristics, would not be
sucient to robustly test for the existence of wage discrimination.
Although this exercise is very simple, these patterns seem to be robust. The
same results are found using slightly dierent specications, see Subsections
5.2.2, 5.2.3 and 5.2.4.
26In the IAB Establishment survey there is an explicit question that ask if the establish-
ment is bound by industry-wide wage agreements, a company agreement concluded by the
establishment and trade unions or not bound by collective agreements.
24A last issue related to segregation is the dierence between segregation
among establishment and segregation within establishments. I have referred
to segregation meaning segregation among establishments. , the measure of
discrimination considered in this paper, captures both direct wage discrimina-
tion and segregation within establishments. In general rms cannot have explicit
dierences in wage policies towards dierent groups but they are allowed to have
as many occupations, and wage categories, as they need and hence to concen-
trate some groups into specic wage categories that is conceptually equivalent
to setting discriminatory wages, but harder to prove. In this paper, I skip this
debate, and both sources of within-rm wage-dierentials are considered to be
discrimination.
5.2 Specication and Robustness Tests
To be able to test for wage discrimination, we need to know the functional
form of F(:;:) in equation 1. However, without making structural assumptions
on the labor market model, the functional form of the wage setting equation is
unknown. As a baseline, I have considered a restrictive log-linear approximation
to F(:;:), with only two types of workers, where the wage policies only dier
across groups in terms of the constant, and the rm heterogeneity is totally
captured by a rm xed eect. In this subsection most of these assumptions
are relaxed and are shown to be non critical.
5.2.1 Types of Workers
The empirical strategy proposed in this paper uses rm level data: hence, I
cannot include a broad set of variables to characterize workers. This may involve
a problem since previous results may capture dierent wage policies towards
other groups that correlate with the migration status. To illustrate this point, let
me assume that immigrants are not discriminated against, but women are, as the
gender composition is signicantly dierent between natives and immigrants27;
thus, I would nd that immigrants are receiving higher salaries than natives.
27See Table 2
25In Table 2, it has been shown that migration status is highly correlated with
gender and job-qualication28. To examine the robustness of my benchmark
estimates, I estimate the model controlling for gender and job qualication.
Gender Composition:To analyze if previous results are driven by dierences
in gender composition, I estimate equation (6) but decomposing the workforce
into four groups in terms of migration status and gender:














jt is the number of male immigrants working in rm j at time t, LNW
jt
is the number of female natives and LIW
jt is the number of female immigrants.










Fixed Effects yes yes
obs, 24,943 24,943
R2 0.3829 0.3452
Note: Each column represents a single within-group linear regression using the panel
of rms. Male-Natives are the reference group. Time Dummies are included in ev-
ery specication. Standard errors in Parentheses. R2 do not take into account the
variation in rm xed eects.
Results are presented in Table 5. We observe that male immigrants receive
wages that are between 9 percent and 13 percent lower than male natives. Fe-
male immigrants receive wages that are between 20 percent and 23 percent
lower than female natives. Women receive lower wages than men. This dier-
ence ranges between 4 percent and 8 percent for natives, but it is not always
28Note in Table 2 that migration status is also highly correlated with the rms sector, but
rms characteristics are captured by the rm xed eect.
26signicant. These ndings are consistent with results presented in Bartolucci
(2010), where estimating a structural model to study gender wage gaps with
the same data-set, women are not found to have signicantly lower bargaining
power in every sector, and the estimated wage gap caused by discrimination is
9 percent.
Skilled-Unskilled Composition: To understand if previous results are driven
by job-qualication composition, I estimate equation (6) also decomposing the
workforce into four groups in terms of migration status and job-qualication:














jt is the number of skilled-immigrant workers in rm j at time t, LNU
jt is
the number of unskilled-natives and LIU
jt is the number of unskilled-immigrants.
The reference group are the natives in skilled occupations. Results are presented
in Table 6.










Fixed Effect yes yes
obs, 24,943 24,943
R2 0.3829 0.316
Note: Each column represents a single within-group linear regression using the panel
of rms. Skilled-Natives are the reference group. Time dummies are included in
every specication. Standard errors in Parentheses. R2 do not take into account the
variation in rm xed eects..
We observe that immigrants surprisingly receive salaries higher than natives
when working in high qualication occupations. Unskilled immigrants receive
27wages signicantly lower than unskilled-natives. It is noteworthy that, although
unskilled workers receive wages 40 percent lower than skilled ones29, once I con-
trol for productivity, native-unskilled workers have a positive wage dierential,
receiving wages that are 35 percent higher that native workers with equiva-
lent productivity, in skilled occupations. This nding is also consistent with
Bartolucci (2010), where unskilled workers are found to have higher bargaining
power in every sector30.
5.2.2 Wage Setting Equation non-linear in log-productivity
The wage setting equation was assumed to be linear in log-productivity. In this
subsection, I test whether relaxing this assumption modies the main results of
the paper. Let me consider the following wage setting equation:
 wjt =  + G(pjt) +  Ijt +  "jt
where as before, productivity is measured as the log-output per worker and G(:)
is a fourth-order polynomial.
Results are presented in Table 7. Although the non-linear component of the
eect of productivity is signicant31, the estimated discrimination parameter, ,
is not found to be statistically dierent from the one estimated using the linear
version of the wage setting equation. Moreover, I nd exactly the same pattern
in term of segregation. Estimating the specication by OLS, see column (1),
 is signicantly positive. OLS estimates of  become insignicant when con-
trolling for rm observable characteristics and negative32 when it is estimated
controlling for rm xed eects, see column (4).
29The conditional mean of wages is 40.7 percent higher for skilled workers than for unskilled
ones. See Table (13) in the Appendix.
30As in Bartolucci (2010), I cannot conclude that skilled workers are being discriminated
against because I am basically comparing dierent jobs.
31The joint test of the tree coecients equal to zero are: F(3;9331) = 163:81 (p-value=0.00)
in column (1), F(3, 9331)=79.93 (p-value=0.00) in column (2), F(3;8950) = 113:58 (p-
value=0.00) in column (3) and F(3;15598) = 434:04 (p-value=0.00) in column (4)
32In the WG estimation,  is signicant at the 10% level, p-value of 8.8%.
28Table 7: Wage Setting Equation Non-Linear on Log-Productivity
wjt (1) (2) (3) (4)
Output 0.265 0.311 0.266 0.017
(0.035) (0.044) (0.044) (0.037)
Output2 0.290 0.289 0.282 0.046
(0.025) (0.027) (0.030) (0.011)
Output3 -0.030 -0.031 -0.029 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0001)
Output4 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0001
(8*10 5) (9*10 5) (1*10 4) (2*10 5)
 0.083 -0.027 -0.063 -0.069
(0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040)
Firm Size - 0.069 0.052 -
- (0.033) (0.004) -
Single - 0.003 0.007 -
- (0.003) (0.003) -
Union - 0.018 0.016 -
- (0.011) (0.011) -
Sector Dummies no no yes -
Region Dummies no no yes -
no no no yes
obs. 24,943 23,720 19,663 24,943
R2 42.80% 45.74% 49.71% 39.67%
Note: Each column represents a single linear regression using the panel of rms. Time
dummies are included in every specication. Standard errors in parentheses. In OLS
regressions (column 1, 2 and 3) standard errors are calculated clustering by rm.
5.2.3 Wage Setting Equation with Group Specic Elasticity to Pro-
ductivity.
In the baseline specication, I consider that the wage elasticity to productivity
is constant across groups. In this subsection, I test whether relaxing this as-
sumption modies the main results of the paper. Let me consider the following
wage setting equation:
 wjt =  +  IjtIpI;jt + (1    Ijt)NpN;jt +  Ijt +  "jt (9)
Where pI;jt is the log-productivity of immigrants in rm j at time t, pN;jt
is the log-productivity of natives in rm j at time t, I is the elasticity of
29wages to immigrants productivity and N is the elasticity of wages to natives
productivity.
Assuming again a Cobb-Douglas production function with quality adjusted
labor input, it has been proved in Section 3.2, that the log of natives' marginal
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1 + (   1) Ijt
)+ Ijt+ "jt
(10)
Where, rearranging and noting that as  is supposed to be near 1, log(1 +
(   1) Ijt)  = (   1) Ijt and log()  = (   1):
 wjt =  + N log(l) + N log(
Yjt
Ljt
) + [(I   N)log(l) + ]  Ijt
+(I   N) Ijt log(
Yjt
Ljt
) + (I   N)(1   ) I2
jt +  "jt:
Therefore, I estimate:
 wjt = A + B pjt + C Ijt + D Ijt pjt + E I2
jt +  "jt;
where, as before  pjt = log(
Yjt
Ljt), and A =  + N log(l); B = N; C =
(I N)log( l)+; D = I N and E = (1 )(I N). Therefore we can
recover estimates of the dierence N  I to be able to evaluate the assumption
made on the baseline specication. Note that, without further information, for
example, an external estimation of l,  can not be recovered from this exercise.
The parameter C, which corresponds to the proportion of immigrants in the
rm, can only identify  when N = I.
Results are presented in Table 8. The wage elasticity to productivity is
not found to be dierent between natives and immigrants. (N   I) is not
statistically dierent from zero and the estimated standard deviation of this
dierence remains within reasonable bounds and ranges between 0.03 and 0.05.
30Table 8: Wage Setting Equation with group specic 
 Wjt (1) (2) (3)
(N   I)log(l) +  0.345 0.135 -0.504
(0.626) (0.604) (0.379)
(N   I) 0.034 -0.017 0.009
(0.055) (0.052) (0.031)
(N   I)(   1) -1.04 0.025 -0.461
(0.114) (0.012) (0.101)
Sector, Region and no yes -
Firms Characteristics
Firm Fixed Effects no no yes
obs. 24,943 20,886 24.943
R2 37.56% 49.92% 39.18%
Note: Each column represents a single linear regression using the panel of rms. A
quartic on productivity and time dummies are included in every specication. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. In OLS regressions (column 1 and 2) standard errors are
calculated clustering by rm.
This last result gives additional support to the baseline specication where 
has been assumed to be homogeneous across groups.
5.2.4 Wage Setting Equation Linear in Levels.
As discussed in Section 3, there are important advantages to considering the
wage setting equation in logs. In this subsection, I recalculate the wage setting
equation parameters taking a linear approximation to F(:;:) in (1). I estimate:
 Wjt = j +   Pjt +  Ijt + jt (11)
where  Wjt is the wage bill per worker of rm j,  Pjt is the output per worker
of rm j, and  Ijt is the proportion of immigrants in rm j at time t. Results
are presented in Table 9.
Although results are less precise than the baseline specication, they are
qualitatively and quantitatively compatible with results presented above. Tak-
ing into account that the mean-wage33 is 2300.10 euros, the OLS estimate of  in
33I consider mean-wage to be the average of total wage bill per-worker over the distribution
of rms in the sample used in columns (1), (3) and (5).
31Table 9: Wage Setting Equation in Levels
 Wjt (1) (2) (3) (4) (4)
Output 0.055 0.060 0.063 0.301 0.124
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.023) (0.023)
Output2 - - - -1.43e 05 -5.06e 07
- - - (2.07e 06) (1.95e 06)
Output3 - - - 2.99e 10 -8.68e 11
- - - (6.92e 11) (6.29e 11)
Output4 - - - -2.01e 15 1.58e 15
- - - (7.58e 16) (6.25e 16)
 132.54 32.98 -344.64 23.91 -383.08
(78.21) (87.85) (124.54) (87.04) (124.24)
Region, Sector and no yes - yes -
Firm Characteristics
Firm fixed effects no no yes no yes
obs. 22,449 18,882 22,449 18,882 22,449
R2 8.79% 12.92% 8.58% 14.56% 9.78%
Note: Each column represents a single linear regression using the panel of rms. Time
dummies are included in every specication. Standard errors in parentheses. In OLS
regressions (column 1, 3 and 4) standard errors are calculated clustering by rm.
32column (1) implies that immigrants are receiving wages 5.7 percent higher than
natives. As before, when including a wider set of controls,  becomes insigni-
cant, see column (2), and signicantly negative when controlling for observable
and unobservable rm xed characteristics, see column (3). The rm xed ef-
fect specication in column (3) suggests that immigrants receive wages that are
15.0 percent lower than natives. When allowing a more exible specication for
output, results do not change signicantly, see columns (4) and (5).
Results presented in Table 9 are considering a sample where observations
of rms with output below the fth percentile and above the 95th percentile
of the output distribution, have been excluded. When considering the entire
sample, the estimated discrimination parameter ranges between -12,957 and
6,071 euros. Taking into account that the gross mean monthly wage in the
sample is approximately 2,300 euros, these results are found to have no economic
meaning. This sample trimming does modify results obtained with the baseline
specication, see Section C in the Appendix.
6 Testing Implications of Discrimination Mod-
els
Another interesting feature of this approach is that it allows me to estimate
(6) with rm specic . Hence, it provides a rm specic measure of wage
discrimination against immigrants which is useful when testing some of the
implications of dierent discrimination models.
There are two mains branches in the theoretical discrimination literature:
Taste Based Discrimination and Statistical Discrimination. These models em-
phasize two broad types of discrimination. The rst is prejudice, which Gary
Becker (1971) formalizes as a "taste" by at least some members of the majority
group against interacting with members of the minority group. The second is
statistical discrimination by employers in the presence of imperfect information
about the skills or behavior of members of the minority group. Even though it
is dicult to empirically distinguish between both theoretical hypotheses, some
33lessons can be drawn from the present exercise.
One of the implications of the model presented in Becker (1971) is that dis-
criminating employers earn lower prots than non-discriminators34, since the
non-discriminators will pay less for their labor by hiring discriminated work-
ers. This implication may be directly tested in this framework. If taste-based
discrimination were the true model we should observe a positive correlation
between j and rm prots.
The rst papers to discuss statistical discrimination were Phelps (1972) and
Arrow (1973). The basic premise of this literature is that rms have limited
information about the skills and turnover propensity of applicants: hence, they
have an incentive to use easily observable characteristics such as race or gen-
der to "statistically discriminate" among workers if these characteristics are
correlated with performance35. There are two main branches in the statistical
discrimination literature.
The rst investigates whether biased racial and gender stereotypes might be
self conrming when the payo for hard-to-observe worker investments depends
on employer beliefs. Therefore an a priori unfounded belief about a group per-
formance may be a posteriori conrmed. This issue, that was mainly addressed
by Arrow (1973) and Coate and Loury (1993), is not analyzed in this paper
because it should be captured controlling for productivity.
The second branch concerns the consequences of group dierences in the
precision of the information that employers have about individual productivity.
It was mainly developed by Aigner and Cain (1977) with subsequent papers
by Lundberg and Startz (1983) and Lundberg (1991). If this were the case, as
rms continuously acquire more information about their worker productivity,
pay would become more dependent on actual productivity and less dependent
on easily observed characteristics like migration status. Therefore we should
34This is pointed out in several papers: see for example Black (1995) and Bowlus and
Eckstein (2002). Both papers analyze employer taste discrimination in a search model which
predict prots to be decreasing in the discrimination coecient.
35Although it is illegal to make hiring, pay, or promotion decisions based on predictions
about worker performance by gender or migration status, such behavior would be hard to
detect in many circumstances.
34observe a positive correlation between tenure and j.
Having rm specic discrimination parameters also allow us to have a better
understanding of immigrant self selection into less discriminatory employers. If
there is self-selection of immigrants into these employers, the expected value of
j obtained here should be dierent from  obtained in the previous section.
To estimate rm specic discrimination parameters, I follow Arellano and
Bonhomme (2010). I estimate equation (6) in two simple steps by rstly ob-
taining the common parameters as follows: I regress the residual of rm specic
regressions of the total wage bill and the variables with constant coecients, on
the proportion of immigrants and a constant term:
Qj  wj;t = (QjZj;t)0 + Qjjt;
where Qj = (ITj   Xj(Xj
0Xj) 1Xji), Xj is a 2  Tj matrix with a column of
ones that identies the rm xed eect and a column with the rm proportion
of immigrants, Tj the individual length of the panel (As my data-set is an
unbalanced panel T is rm-specic) and Zj is a matrix that contains those
variables with constant coecients: that are time dummies, and output per
worker or value added per worker depending on the specication.














Note that the estimated rm-specic xed eect as the rm specic discrimi-
nation parameter are equal to the true parameters plus a term that is O(1=T 0:5
j ):
See Arellano and Bonhomme (2009) for more details.
The sample used in this exercise is the panel of rms. Given that I estimate
two rm specic coecients, only rms with more than two observations have
been considered. Firm specic j are only identied in these rms where the
proportion of immigrants varies: therefore rms with no, or marginal variation
36The MATA code to estimate a linear model with random coecients is available from the
author upon request





V alue Added - 0.174
- (0.006)
 j -0.489 -0.921
(0.334) (0.374)
mean( j) 2.45 5.84
(0.030) (0.032)
B
Second Stage Regressions j j j j
Profits -7.0e 10 -9.7e 8 -6.9e 9 -1.4e 7
(3.2e 9) (3.6e 8) (3.5e 9) (4.0e 8)
Tenure of Immigrants 3.5e 5 -1.5e 4 4.5e 5 -1.1e 4
(1.9e 5) (2.1e 4) (2.0e 5) (2.3e 4)
Proportion of Immigrants 0.025 1.68 -0.166 3.39
(0.23) (2.60) (0.249) (2.91)
Unionized Workforce -0.133 0.749 -0.053 0.267
(0.081) (0.909) (0.087) (1.02)
Single Establishment -0.145 0.887 -0,284 0.415
(0.081) (0.902) (0.086) (1.01)
Constant 2.61 -1.50 5.79 {1.03
(0.108) (1.20) (0.115) (1.34)
Observations 1,877 1,877
Note: Each column in panel A represents a single linear regression with xed eects
and rm specic  using the panel of rms. Time dummies are included in both spec-
ication. Each Column in Panel B represents single linear regression of the estimated
j and j in Panel A on selected rm specic variables. Sector dummies are included.
Standard errors, in parentheses in both panels. Standard deviation of  j and  j are
corrected following Arellano and Bonhomme (2009).
in the proportion of immigrants have been excluded37.
Results are presented in Table 10. Given the short time dimension, most of
the variation in the rm-specic coecients is only noise, and hence the second
step is mostly imprecise. Firm xed eects are found to be negatively correlated
37In particular, in order to exclude rms with low variation in  Ijt, from the whole sample of
rms with positive variation in  Ijt, I exclude every rm where the standard deviation of the
proportion of immigrants is below the 10th percentile of the rms distribution of the standard
deviations of  Ijt
36with the rm prots38. As these xed eects represent wages, given productiv-
ity this nding is not surprising. Firms with higher average tenure are found
to be better payers. Although the covariance is marginally signicant when
using output as a measure of productivity, single establishments are in general
worse payers. The proportion of immigrants is not found to be signicantly
correlated with the rm-specic discrimination parameter, which is important
for the robustness of the main result of the paper, where  is assumed to be
homogeneous.
In order to test some of the implications of the taste based discrimination
and statistical discrimination theories, I nally regress the rm specic dis-
crimination parameter in the rm's mean prots and the rm's mean tenure of
immigrants. I nd that the mean-tenure of immigrants in the rm is negatively
but not signicantly associated with the discrimination parameter. On the other
hand, prots have a signicantly negative correlation with the discrimination
parameter: that means that rms with higher prots discriminate more, against
what is predicted by the taste-based discrimination literature. This may be un-
derstood to be indirect evidence against the taste based discrimination model.
7 Conclusion
The Hellerstein and Neumark strategy has been found to be a very direct
and popular method to detect wage discrimination using matched employer-
employee data. The purpose of this paper is to develop a test for wage dis-
crimination that completes the Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) approach. The
proposed method estimates a wage setting equation at the rm level that ex-
ploits changes in productivity and changes in the native-immigrant composition
within rm across time in order to have identication of dierent wage policies
toward those groups. This test add to the existing one in four main dimensions:
it is robust to labor market segregation, it does not impose linearity in the wage
setting equation, it avoids the problematic estimation of production functions,
38The covariance between rm xed eects and prots is only signicant when using Value
Added.
37and it is not only a test for discrimination, but also produces measurements of
discrimination.
Using Matching Employer-Employee data from Germany, I nd that im-
migrants are suering wage discrimination. Depending on which measure of
productivity is used, discrimination ranges between 12.8 percent and 16.8 per-
cent. This nding is surprising if we take into account that both the traditional
approach and the Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) approach conclude that im-
migrants do not receive signicantly lower wages in Germany.
The elasticity of wages to productivity is signicantly dierent from one
and hence assuming wages equal, or a constant fraction of productivity may be
dangerous. Although the reduced-form wage setting equation is very simple, it
has an acceptable t of the wage data and without controlling for rm xed
characteristics, I obtain similar results to those that would be obtained with
employee-level data. When estimating by OLS, discrimination is found to be
signicantly lower, which provides evidence of positive segregation of immigrants
into good rms. In order to understand the nature of this segregation, I included
dierent sets of controls and I nd that most of the segregation is accounted by
dierences in region, sector and rm size.
I nd that female immigrants are more discriminated against than males.
They receive wages between 20 and 23 percent lower than female natives while
male immigrants receive wages between 9 and 13 percent lower than male na-
tives. Unskilled immigrants receive salaries lower than unskilled natives but
immigrants working in high-qualication occupations receive higher wages than
their native counterparts.
The basic results of the paper are robust. Estimating a similar specica-
tion but considering wages and output instead of log-wages and log-output or
allowing a more exible specication for productivity, I nd the same results.
Although  has been assumed to be the same between natives and immigrants, I
do not nd evidence of dierences in the wage elasticity to productivity between
both groups.
I do not nd signicant evidence of immigrants moving to those less discrim-
38inatory rms nor signicant evidence in favor of the statistical discrimination
model but I do nd evidence against a taste-based discrimination model.
A Mean of log-productivity and log of mean
productivity
As it is not possible to recover the mean of log-productivity using output data,
I use the log of mean productivity. Assuming that wages and productivity are
log-normally distributed, it is possible to correct for the dierences between the
mean of log-productivity and the log of mean productivity including a measure
of the within-rm variance of productivity. Omitting this correction, estimates
would be still correct if I assume that this within-rm variance remains constant
across time and then these dierences become part of the rm xed eects. The
main weakness of this approach is that I have to assume that the rm-specic
variance of productivity does not change when composition changes.
For a more robust, and complex, solution to this problem, I can rearrange
equation (2):
Wijt = ej(Pijt)()Iie"ijt;
and then, solving for Pijt:
Pijt = e(j=)(Wijt)(1=)(=)Iie("ijt=):
Aggregating within rm:
 Pjt = e(j=) X
i2j
(Wijt)(1=)(=)Iie("ijt=):
This can not be estimated directly, because Wijt is endogenous to the model
and it is then correlated with the error term "ijt: However, the wage setting
equation provides me proper instruments as  Pjt and Ii to estimate it by GMM.
This alternative is one of the main point in the research agenda.
39B The 1999 German Reform of the Citizenship
and Nationality Law
In May 1999, the German Parliament amended the Citizenship and Nationality
Law of 1913. The reform had three main elements:
 changes in the naturalization criteria;
 denial of dual citizenship;
 introduction of birthright citizenship.
Before the new legislation came into force, foreign nationals were granted
entitlement to naturalization only after 15 years of residence in Germany. With
the new legislation, a foreign national is entitled to naturalization after lawfully
residing in Germany for eight years. The only requirements comprise: loyalty to
the German Constitution, no need for social security or unemployment benets,
no criminal convictions and an adequate command of the German language.
Although anecdotal evidence suggests than dual citizenship was hardly allowed
by ocials before the reform, the 1999 reform includes an explicit denial of
dual citizenship. Before 1999, a child born in Germany would gain German
citizenship if at least one of the parents possessed German citizenship at the
time of birth. Under the new regime, a child born of foreign parents would gain
citizenship at birth if at least one parent had been legally resident in Germany
for eight years.
In this paper I use data on nationality to identify immigrants. This law is
supposed to have implications for the population of immigrants in which I am
interested on. In order to take this point into account, I estimate the baseline
specication with two subsamples, before and after 1999. Results are reported
in Table 11.
Although the estimates dier among both subsamples, these dierences are
not signicantly dierent from zero. Moreover, the main ndings of the paper
are valid for both time periods. Immigrants are found to have lower wages, once
40Table 11: The 1999 German Reform
Before 1999 After 1999
wjt reg wg reg wg
output 0.405 0.586. 0.431 0.389
(0.029) (0.016) (0.015) (0.008)
 0.135 -0.104 0.045 -0.211
(0.058) (0.079) (0.047) (0.056)
obs. 5,660 5,660 19,283 19,283
R2 36.3% - 37.0% -
R2-With. - 33.2% - 18.7%
R2-Betw. - 39.8% - 38.1%
Note: Each column represents a single linear regression using the panel of rms. Time
dummies are included in every specication. Standard errors in parentheses. In OLS
regressions standard errors are calculated clustering by rm.
we control for observed and unobserved rm xed characteristics. Based on the
dierences in  estimated by OLS and WG, there is evidence suggesting positive
segregation of immigrants before and after the 1999 reform of the Citizenship
and Nationality Law.
C Sample Selection
As it can be seen in Subsection 5.2.4, when the equations are estimated in
levels, not in logs, results are very sensitive to observations in the tails of the
distribution of output. In this section, I show that this is not the case for the
baseline specication. I estimate again the wage setting equation (6), but with
the same sample trimming used in Subsection 5.2.4.
Results are presented in Table 12. The estimates of  in every specication
are found to be equivalent to those estimated with the full sample. This sample
selection does not modify the main ndings of the paper.
41Table 12: Wage Setting Equation - Sample Trimming
 Wjt (1) (2) (3)
Output 0.351 0.364 0.353
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
 0.070 0.022 -0.094
(0.024) (0.025) (0.039)
Region, Sector and no yes -
firm Characteristics
Firm fixed effects no no yes
obs. 22,449 18,882 22,449
R2 19.58% 12.92% 19.29%
Note: Each column represents a single linear regression using the panel of rms. Time
dummies are included in every specication. Standard errors in parentheses. In OLS
regressions, columns (1) and (2), standard errors are calculated clustering by rm.
The sample used in this estimation exclude observations with output below the fth
percentile and above the 95
th percentile of the output distribution.
D Detecting Discrimination - Traditional Ap-
proach
In order to compare dierent strategies to detect wage discrimination, in this
section I provide estimates of discrimination using Mincer-type wage equations.
As can be seen in Table 13, immigrants have positive wage dierentials. Con-
trolling for observed characteristics, they receive wages that are, on average, 7.2
percent higher than natives.
Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
Using results presented in Table 13, I perform an Oaxaca-Blinder decompo-
sition which simply decomposes the wage-gap between dierences in observable
and unobservable characteristics.
The results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition are presented in Table
14. The counterfactual immigrants' mean-wage has to be interpreted as the
mean-wage that immigrants would have if they had the natives' distribution of
observable characteristics. Therefore the dierence between the counterfactual
immigrants mean-wage and the observed immigrants mean-wage is the portion
of the gap that is due to dierences in observable characteristics.
42Table 13: Mincer Wage Equations - Censored-Normal Regression. Maximum
Likelihood Estimates
General Natives Immigrants
Sex -0.185 -0.186 -0.150
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0009)
Immigrant 0.072 - -
(0.0004) - -
Age 0.061 0.065 0.035
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Primary Education 0.237 0.241 0.204
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0008)
College -0.246 -0.246 -0.202
(incomplete) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0025)
Technical College 0.370 0.376 0.314
(completed) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0026)
College 0.583 0.588 0.516
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0033)
University Degree 0.709 0.716 0.648
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0023)
Tenure 0.020 0.020 0.014
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Experience 0.026 0.025 0.033
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Skilled 0.407 0.411 0.357
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0055)
Part-time jobs -0.696 -0.703 -0.616
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0013)
Constant 2.381 2.319 2.894
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0031)
Pseudo R2 46.5% 50.8% 46.3%
Observations 13,017,732 11,832,370 1,185,362
Note: Each column represents a single Maximum-Likelihood linear regression using
the panel of workers. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Native-men with no
formal education in low-qualication occupations are the reference group. Time and
Sector Dummies included.
43Table 14: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
(a) Observed (b) Observed (c) Counterfactual
Natives Mean Immigrants Mean Immigrants Mean
Daily Wage Daily Wage Daily Wage
109.0 e 94.7 e 111.2 e
Total W-Gap Explained Unexplained
((b)-(a))/(a) W-Gap=((b)-(c))/(a) W-Gap=((c)-(a))/(a))
-13.1% -15.1% 2.0%
The portion of the unconditional wage-gap that is not accounted for by
observable characteristics has usually been interpreted as wage discrimination.
In this case, immigrants would not be discriminated against. They would be
receiving wages that are 2 percent higher than similar natives.
E Detecting Discrimination - Hellerstein and Neu-
mark (1999) Approach
In order to compare my results with results found using the Hellerstein and
Neumark (1999) approach, I estimate the rm production function and the rm
wage equation. The production function is given by:
Ln(Yjt) = const: + kLn(Kjt) + lLn(L
Q
jt); (12)
using rm level data, where Yjt is the value added by rm j at time t, Kjt is
depreciated capital39 of rm j at time t, and L
Q















39The survey gives information about investment made to replace depreciated capital. As-
suming that a constant fraction (d) of capital depreciates by unit of time: Kd
jt = d  Kjt )
log(Kd
jt) = log(d) + log(Kjt): Therefore k log(d) goes to the constant term.
44where Lmns
jt is the number of male, native and skilled workers, Lwns
jt is the
number of female, native and skilled workers, Lmis
jt is the number of male,
immigrant and skilled workers, Lmnu
jt is the number of male native and unskilled
workers, Lwis
jt is the number of female, immigrants and skilled workers, Lwnu
jt is
the number of female, native and unskilled workers, Lmiu
jt is the number of male,
immigrant and unskilled workers, and Lwiu
jt is the number of female, immigrants
and unskilled workers in rm j at time t:
The wage equation is given by:
Ln(Wjt) = const: + Ln(L
Q
jt); (13)
where Wjt is the total wage bill paid by rm j at time t: In Table 15, I report the
results from the estimations of the production function and wage equations using
the total wages and salaries reported in the LIAB as paid by the establishment
between 1996 and 2004. In column (1) I present parameters estimated from
equation (12) by non-linear least squared regressions, In column (2) I report
parameters estimated from equation (13) by non-linear least squared, and in
column (3) I report p-values from tests of equality between parameters reported
in column (1) and (2).
Looking rst at the production function estimates in column (1), I nd
that the coecient for immigrants indicates that foreign workers are somewhat
equally productive to natives with an estimate of i that is 0.99, not signicantly
dierent from one. I also nd that productivity of women is surprisingly low
and that workers in unskilled occupations produce two thirds less than workers
in skilled occupations. Looking at the wage equation I nd similar patterns
in terms of immigrants and women. Workers in unskilled occupations receive
salaries that are 53 percent lower than workers in skilled occupations.
Column (3) of Table 15 reports the p-values of tests of equality of the co-
ecients from the production function (column (1)) and the wage equation
(column (2)). The results for immigrants are not conclusive, as the productiv-
ity gap and the wage gap are not signicantly dierent from zero. The results
45Table 15: Hellerstein et al Approach
(1) (2) (3)
Output Wage p-value (1)-(2)
Immigrants 0.99 0.98 54.2%
(0.09) (0.03) -
Women 0.34 0.38 3.7%
(0.02) (0.01) -
Unskilled 0.33 0.47 0.0%
(0.01) (0.01) -
k 0.16 - -
(0.01) - -
l 0.89 - -
(0.01) - -
 - 1.05 -
- (0.002) -
constant 9.29 7.47 -
(0.62) (0.02) -
R2 0.82 0.92 -
Observations 12,259 17,224 -
Note: Columns (1) and (2) represent single non-linear regressions using the panel of
rms. Male{Skilled-Natives are the reference group. Time Dummies are included in
every specication. Standard errors are given in Parentheses.
46for women show that the productivity gap between men and women exceeds the
wage gap. The wedge between relative wages and relative productivity is -0.04
(0.34 - 0.038), and the p-value of the test of the equality of relative wages and
relative productivity for women is 3.7 percent. This approach would conclude
that men are being discriminated against.
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